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Abstract 
Change blindness (CB) – the failure to notice visual changes – is an important source of human errors in managing dynamic 
multitasking situations, especially when the tempo at which the situation evolves as well as the timeliness of the decisions are 
critical to performance and to achieving higher order goals. The support of temporal awareness – in the form of a Temporal 
Overview Display (TOD) – proved successful in promoting time-based decision heuristics and increasing the timeliness of 
actions. In the present study, we test the impact on CB of a tool that provides an external time-based representation of the 
situation and its evolution within an air-warfare simulation that requires participants to perform radar-based subtasks. Although 
the use of the TOD was previously shown beneficial to performance, the tool may come with a drawback as participants missed a 
greater number of critical changes compared to a control condition. The TOD is associated with an exacerbation of the attentional 
source of CB as suggested by a higher percentage of fixated undetected changes. The contextual cues essential to detect a change 
may not be salient enough to be quickly found in the tool, especially when the operator must deal with time pressure, 
multitasking and multiple other sources of information. Our study highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to system 
development and evaluation in order to prevent unintended consequences such as higher CB rates. 
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1. Introduction 
The need to augment cognition and to support different aspects of dynamic decision-making is ever increasing, 
especially since the information on which to base the decisions has grown in volume and complexity. Constraints 
such as high risk, heavy workload, multitasking, uncertainty, and information ambiguity put a great strain on the 
operator who needs to make sound and timely decisions [1]. In fact, the overload of information to collect, monitor 
and process before making a decision, and the high rate to which this information changes over time contribute to 
failures of visual awareness, that is the inefficacy of cognitive processes involved in selecting visual stimuli to 
encode in memory for performing tasks, such as those involved in information-rich display environments [2,3]. 
Change blindness (CB) is an example of a failure of visual awareness and is defined by the incapacity to notice a 
task-relevant change in a visual scene [4]. CB is an important source of human errors, especially when the tempo at 
which the situation evolves as well as the timeliness of the decisions are key to performance and to achieving higher 
order goals [5]. In most safety-critical work domains (e.g., air traffic control, security surveillance), consequences of 
missing an incident can be disastrous (e.g., life loss and property damages) [3]. 
CB has been mostly studied within static single-task experimental settings. Individuals taking part in those 
studies had to detect a single change within a picture, for instance. Techniques such as the flicker, the mud-splash, 
and the saccade-contingent paradigms were used to prevent the visual system to automatically capture transient 
signals produced by the transition between the pre-change and the post-change states of a visually displayed object, 
and thus induce CB [4,6]. Such studies conclude that CB is mainly a pre-attentive phenomenon: a change goes 
unnoticed, because it was never attended; the eyes of the participants were elsewhere on the visual scene or their 
vision of the change was obstructed by an exogenous event [6]. Although directed attention is necessary for change 
detection, it is not necessarily sufficient; individuals can look at a change without seeing it [7,8]. Using a dynamic 
multitasking simulation, combined with eye tracking, Vachon et al. (2012) provided evidence for another source of 
CB: An attended change may go unnoticed because of a failure of attentional processes. In such a case, fixated 
changes that remained undetected are processed up to a certain level, but not sufficiently to allow them to reach 
conscious awareness. Complex dynamic situations are particularly susceptible to this form of CB as the operator’s 
attentional processes can be overloaded with multiple other sources of information to monitor, actions to schedule 
and other tasks to carry out, sometimes leaving insufficient resources for changes to be consciously detected [9].  
The dimension of time, which can be characterized by the time taken to make a decision and to perform a task as 
well as the timeliness of the series of actions that need to be carried out, is a central concern in the successful 
management of complex dynamic situations [10,11]. CB is intrinsically related to the concept of temporal 
awareness, that is, the quality of the mental representation of the recent events and of what could occur next [5,12]. 
Missing an important change in the evolution of a situation would compromise the mental representation of the 
temporality of recent events necessary to an operator to schedule his future actions and decisions properly. Given 
that time management is a challenging aspect of dynamic decision-making, Tremblay, Vachon, Rousseau, and 
Breton (2012) tested the efficacy of a decision support system, designed in the form of a scheduling aid to promote 
temporal awareness in the context of simulated military air-traffic control. The Temporal Overview Display (TOD) 
is an external time-based representation of the situation and its evolution that displays temporal components such as 
time-to-decide (time before an attack from a hostile aircraft) and time to hit a target across a timeline. The TOD 
proved successful in promoting time-based decision heuristics, increasing the timeliness of actions [13], and also in 
improving situation awareness as measured by the QUASA technique [14]. However, Vallières, Hodgetts, Vachon 
and Tremblay (2012) showed in a multitasking dynamic situation that the Change History EXplicit, a tool 
specifically designed to support change detection [15], was not only ineffective in reducing CB but also impaired 
performance to other subtasks [16]. It is then important to investigate the possible indirect – positive or negative – 
impact on change detection of a tool that supports another important cognitive function involved in dynamic 
decision-making. 
In the present study, we investigated whether the TOD, shown to be effective in supporting temporal awareness, 
may also come with an overhead or a benefit to change detection by assessing the impact of using or not the TOD on 
the rate of CB. We used the Simulated Combat Control System (S-CCS) microworld, a functional simulation of the 
cognitive activities performed by a tactical coordinator aboard Canadian navy frigate [9,15]. Participants must 
conduct four radar-based tasks concurrently: monitor a radar screen representing the airspace around the ship, 
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evaluate the threat level and immediacy of every aircraft, take appropriate defensive measures against hostile 
aircraft, and detect critical changes. Change detection could benefit from the TOD support as it could help 
participants noticing aircraft that get closer temporally to the own ship and that require immediate defensive actions. 
We monitored eye movements as an index of attentional allocation to determine the effect of TOD on the two 
sources of CB by dividing the detection rate according to whether changes were fixated or not. Eye tracking also 
provided TOD usage metrics such as percentage of dwell time and fixations on the tool, along with behavioral data 
such as a percentage of aircraft selections made using the timeline. The NASA-TLX questionnaire [19] was used to 
measure perceived workload in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the TOD. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Forty-two students at Université Laval (21 men; mean age: 22.8) were randomly assigned to either the TOD or 
the control condition (21 in each). All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and received $20 
compensation for their participation in a single two-hour experimental session. 
2.2. Microworld 
The S-CCS microworld is a low-level, computer-controlled simulation of single ship naval above-water warfare. 
The simulation is dynamic and evolves according to a scenario in interaction with the participants’ actions playing 
the role of tactical coordinator onboard a Canadian frigate. Typical scenarios of the microworld involve multiple 
aircraft moving in the vicinity of the ship and some of them may represent threats to the frigate. As a tactical 
coordinator, participants must stay vigilant for changes in the operational space, conduct threat assessments, 
including the categorization and prioritization of threats, and schedule the application of combat power for 
neutralizing hostile aircraft through retaliatory missile firing. 
The original visual interface is shown in Figure 1 (left picture) and can be divided into three parts: 1) a radar 
screen, 2) a parameter list, and 3) a set of action buttons. The radar screen is a geospatial representation of the 
participant’s ship (the center of the radar) surroundings in which aircraft move in real time with various speeds and 
directions. Aircraft are white dot icons surrounded by a green square and they can appear anywhere on the radar 
screen. A leader is connected to each aircraft icon and gives a visual indication of the aircraft speed and direction. 
To select an aircraft, participant must left click on its icon with the mouse and its surrounding square turns red to 
indicate that the aircraft is selected. The parameters list displays information related to the selected aircraft. 
Participants assign threat level and immediacy, and neutralize a target aircraft by using the action buttons. 
 
 
Fig. 1. S-CCS interface for the control condition (left picture). Three areas of interest are defined: 1) Aircraft parameter list, 2) Radar screen, and 
3) Action buttons. The TOD was implemented to the right of the radar screen (right picture) and it is the fourth area of interest. 
1 2 
3 
4 
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2.3 Task 
First, participants had to classify all aircraft that appeared progressively on the radar screen according to three 
possible threat levels: non-hostile, uncertain or hostile. Such categorization depended on the application of a pre-set 
classification rule that took into account five equally weighted parameters displayed in the list: Origin, Altitude, 
Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF), Military Electronic Emissions (Emissions), Detection of Weapons (Weapons). 
Each of these parameters could take either a threatening or a non-threatening value, and the number of threatening 
cues determined the threat level of the selected aircraft (non-hostile = 0-1 threatening cue; uncertain = 2-3 
threatening cues; hostile = 4-5 threatening cues). Participants were asked to click on the corresponding classification 
button to assign a threat level to the selected aircraft, changing its white dot to red for hostile, yellow for uncertain, 
or green for non-hostile. Participants received the instruction to recheck the parameters of already-classified aircraft 
regularly, since their threat level could change over the course of a scenario. 
Second, participants were asked to determine the level of threat immediacy of all hostile aircraft based on their 
temporal proximity from the ship. To do so, participants added the parameter values for TCPA (Time to closest 
point of approach) and CPAUT (CPA in units of time) to prioritize their actions. Threat immediacy could be high (< 
15 s from hitting the ship), medium (15–30 s), or low (> 30 s). Participants had to left click on the immediacy button 
corresponding to their choice (1 to 3 respectively).  
The third subtask was to defend the ship against hostile aircraft by launching missiles given that hostile radar 
contacts were programmed to hit the ship. This required participants only to select the aircraft they wanted to 
neutralize and then click on the Engage button to launch the missile. The airborne projectile was represented by a 
small white dot on the radar screen. Only one hostile aircraft could be neutralized at one time. 
Finally, participants needed to stay alert to status changes occurring in the operational space. Each aircraft could 
take either a non-hostile or an uncertain status when appearing on the radar screen. During a scenario, the threat 
level of some aircraft could change from non-threatening to a threatening (i.e. hostile) status. Because hostile 
aircraft were programmed to hit the ship, such changes were therefore considered critical. An aircraft having 
undergone a critical change would need a reassessment of threat level and immediacy, and a retaliatory action to be 
scheduled. Each critical change was accompanied by a change of speed, of direction, or both, allowing the change to 
be noticeable on the radar screen. A critical change was considered detected if the changing aircraft was selected 
within 10 s of the change. 
 
2.4 TOD tool 
 
The design of the TOD tool was inspired from other tools that were developed to support temporal components in 
dynamic decision-making and work in the visual analytics domain [see 17,18] In the TOD condition, the tool was 
inserted to the right of the radar screen (see Figure 1, right picture, AOI 4). The TOD represents temporal 
information explicitly by presenting aircraft across a timeline. In fact, the TOD presents the same information about 
speed and distance as the geospatial display, but in a time-scaled dynamic illustration. The TOD timeline is a more 
abstract tool than the radar screen as it does not visually represent aircraft in their physical environment. The 
temporal interface is made of a grid background where vertical lines delimited the three levels of threat immediacy 
an aircraft can take in order to help estimating its temporal proximity from the own ship. A single vertical red line 
identifies the ''now''. Each aircraft is represented by a horizontal rectangle, moving from right to left that 
corresponds to the addition of TCPA and CPAIUT. An aircraft hits the ship when the right end of its rectangle 
crosses the red line. Selecting an aircraft on either the TOD timeline or the radar screen would highlight information 
relative to the selected aircraft in both displays. 
 
2.4 Eye tracking 
 
Eye movements were recorded with a Tobii T1750 eye tracker (Tobii Technology) at a sampling rate of 50 Hz. 
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor at a distance of 60 cm. Infrared eye-tracking cameras are 
integrated into this monitor allowing participants to freely move their head. Each fixation had to last at least 100 ms 
to be recorded. The functional field of view of a fixation corresponded to a 50-pixel radius circle. In addition to 
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being a usability metric of the interface AOIs (see Figure 1), fixations on specific aircraft during the 10 s following a 
change were indicative of whether a critically-changed aircraft were attended or not during that time window. A 
critical change was considered fixated if the aircraft which underwent the change (or the tool gridline when 
available) fell within 50-pixels of the center point of a fixation at least once during the 10 s post-change period. 
 
2.5 Procedure 
 
After reading a tutorial describing the context of the simulation and the tasks to execute, participants were asked 
to perform the threat classification and immediacy tasks from nine static screenshots of the S-CCS microworld 
visual interface in order to verify their understanding. They familiarized themselves with the microworld dynamic 
environment through two training sessions, which included of four 3-min scenarios. After the calibration of the eye 
tracker, participants performed four randomly presented experimental blocks. Each block comprised four 4-min 
scenarios of similar difficulty, for a total of 64 min of experimental testing. Each test scenario included a set of 27 
aircraft (11 non-hostile, 8 uncertain, and 8 hostile). A total of eight critical changes occurred during a test scenario 
while a maximum of 10 aircraft could appear on the radar screen at any one time. Overall, a participant had to detect 
128 critical changes. After each scenario, participants answered aloud two questions regarding the mental and 
temporal demand indices from the NASA-TLX subjective workload questionnaire [19]. 
3. Results 
We assessed usage of the TOD based on the percentage of fixations and dwell time, as well as aircraft selections 
made using the tool. In order to make a holistic evaluation of the impact of the TOD on dynamic decision-making, 
the TOD and control conditions were compared according to two aspects of the participant’s activities: 1) change-
detection performance, 2) subjective mental workload. The alpha level was set at .05. 
Table 1 shows that the TOD usage was minimal; participants fixated on the tool for an average of 180 s out of a 
64-min experiment and 16.38% of aircraft selections were made using the tool. This level of TOD usage did not 
prevent the tool to have a negative impact on change detection. Overall, 29.1 % (SD=11.28) of critical changes were 
missed in the TOD condition and 22.4% (SD=7.26) in the control condition, and this difference of CB rate was 
significant, t(40)=-2.28, p=.029, d=0.71. However, the speed of detection of critical changes did not differ 
significantly between conditions, t(40)=-1.146, p=.259, d=.35, where participants took an average 3815.16 ms 
(SD=433.59) in the control condition and 3989.16 ms (SD=544.48) in the TOD condition. The percentage of 
undetected changes increased with aircraft selections using the TOD r(21)=.638, p=.002, R2=.47, and dwell time on 
the TOD r(21)=.705, p<.001, R2=.50, suggesting that making greater usage of the TOD seemed to further aggravate 
the occurrence of CB. 
  
 Table 1. Aircraft selections and ocular metrics (mean + SD) of TOD usage. 
 Usage of TOD 
Mean number of aircraft selections  
 On the tool 147.1 (272.86)  
 On the radar 629.67 (224.92) 
Eye movements on the tool  
 % of overall dwell time  4.69 (5.22)  
 % of fixations 8.27 (7.85) 
 
Undetected changes were also examined according to whether or not they had been fixated in the 10-s post-
change interval in order to verify the impact of the TOD on the two sources of CB. The data of Figure 2 were 
submitted to a 2 (fixation; fixated vs. non-fixated) × 2 (condition; control vs. TOD) mixed ANOVA. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of fixation, F(1,40)=222.57, p<.001, η2p=.85, pointing to better detection of 
changing aircraft that were fixated. There was no significant effect of condition, F(1, 40)<1. More importantly, the 
interaction effect was significant, F(1, 40)=8.70, p=.005, η2p=.18. Simple effect tests revealed that there was no 
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difference between the two conditions for non-fixated undetected changes (p=.097), but that the presence of the 
TOD virtually doubled the amount of fixated undetected changes found in the control condition (p=.002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mean percentage of undetected changes according to whether they were fixated or not for the control and TOD conditions. Error bars 
represent 95% confident intervals. 
Critical changes that had been fixated were then examined according to whether they were detected or not to 
verify the impact of the TOD on the dwell time on the changing aircraft during the 10-s post-change interval using 
the radar and/or the TOD (see Table 2). A 2 (detection: detected vs. undetected) × 2 (condition) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a significant effect of detection F(1,40)=113.64, p<.001, η2p=.74, with greater dwell time on detected 
changes than undetected changes on the radar screen and/or the TOD. The interaction effect was not significant, 
F(1,40)=1.04, p=.408, η2p=.025, but the main effect of condition was significant, F(1,40)=6.84, p =.012, η2p=.146. 
Participants in the TOD condition spent more time looking at the changing aircraft during the 10-s post-change 
interval using the radar screen and/or on the tool than participants assigned to the control condition; meaning that the 
presence as well as the usage of TOD seemed indeed responsible for the exacerbation of CB. 
 
Table 2. Dwell time on changing aircraft using the radar or the TOD during the 10-s post-change interval  
 Control TOD 
Using the radar (in ms)   
 Undetected changes 604.97 (156.12) 369.53 (205.69) 
 Detected changes 1216.26 (274.25) 1064.14 (398.13) 
Using the tool (in ms)   
 Undetected changes N/A 684.15 (677.85) 
 Detected changes N/A 511.87 (518.75) 
 
Finally, we completed our comprehensive assessment of TOD efficiency by measuring the perceived levels of 
mental load and time pressure using the two subscales of the NASA-TLX questionnaire (Figure 3). The two 
conditions showed no significant difference in the mean levels of mental load, t(40)=-1.217, p=.231, d=-0.38, and 
time pressure, t(40)=<1, p=.658, d=-0.13, suggesting that the TOD had no impact on subjective mental workload.  
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Fig. 3. NASA-TLX average mental load and time pressure scores for the control and TOD conditions. Error bars represent 95% confident 
intervals  
4. Discussion 
 
The objective of the study was to evaluate the impact of the TOD – a tool that provides a visual representation of 
temporal components of dynamic decision-making across a timeline – on change detection and perceived workload. 
Even though the TOD was previously shown beneficial to performance, temporal awareness and situation awareness 
[13,14], the current results reveal that the tool comes with a considerable drawback; the use of the TOD seems to 
increase the occurrence of CB when compared to the rate of CB obtained without the support of the TOD. 
Participants’ usage of TOD, even minimal, resulted in more attended changes that remained unnoticed as shown by 
the higher percentage of fixated changes that remained undetected. The TOD does not seem to provide change-
related information in a manner that would truly help cross-references with the information displayed by the radar 
screen required for change detection. The ‘pre-attentive’ source of CB – i.e. non-fixated changes that are undetected 
– and perceived workload were not affected by the TOD. Even though the participants did not seem to perceive any 
additional load, results suggest that the TOD may have caused an attentional overload.  
The interpretation of the negative impact of the TOD on CB can be related to the theoretical foundations of the 
NSEEV (noticing – salience, effort, expectancy, value) model [20]. According to this model, the distribution of 
attention in a dynamic visual workspace as well as the noticing behaviors depend upon a bottom-up factor (the 
salience of the item of interest), two top-down factors (the expectancy of an event occurring in a particular location, 
and the value or the task-relevancy of the information displayed in a region of interest) and the effort needed to shift 
attention towards the item (the further the operator’s gaze point is from the item to notice, the more effortful the 
attention shift would be). The exacerbation of the ‘attentional’ source of CB associated with the TOD can be 
explained by the lack of static salience of the change-related objects in the timeline. Indeed, in the NSEEV model, 
there is a distinction between static salience (feature contrast of the item of interest and the environment) and 
dynamic salience (moment-to-moment changes of static salience) [21,22]. The TOD provides an additional source 
of information about the speed and distance of all aircraft visible on the radar screen, consequently increasing the 
dynamic saliency of the transient signals related to the occurrence of critical changes; changes in speed and direction 
that accompanied critical changes can also be noticed in the TOD. However, as on the radar, the objects that 
produced critical changes share the same contrast, color and luminance in the tool than objects that produced non-
critical changes or no change at all. Although participants attended to some of the objects associated with critical 
changes, the attentional processing devoted to these objects might not have been enough to extract sufficiently the 
contextual cues required to consciously detect the changes, as there are no salient static features that distinguish a 
critically-changed aircraft from any other on the radar and the TOD. Attempts to discriminate critical changes from 
non-critical changes using the tool may have exceeded participants’ attentional capacity and caused temporary 
breakdowns in attentional processes, increasing the likelihood that a critical change would be missed. 
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The NSEEV model can also provide an explanation for the minimal use of the TOD. Eye-tracking measures 
extracted during the 10 s following a change revealed that participants in the TOD condition spent more time 
looking at the critically-changing aircraft using the tool and/or the radar for both undetected and detected changes. 
This could mean that they expected to detect critical changes using the TOD or thought that the tool presented 
valuable change-related information across its timeline that could have improved their detection performance. 
Therefore, expectancy and value may not be responsible for the minimal use of the TOD. However, the timeline was 
implemented to the right-hand side of the screen, which is located to the opposite of the parameters and action 
buttons. It is possible that participants decided not to invest the effort in shifting their attention towards the tool, 
when the information to monitor and process for performing all the subtasks (change detection, categorization, and 
scheduling and application of defensive measures) could be found centrally (i.e., on the radar) or on the left-hand 
side of the screen (i.e., on the parameter list). Under the high workload, time pressure and attention demanding 
conditions of the air-warfare simulation, participants might have judged the TOD too effortful to consult and 
decided to use it minimally. Spending the effort to use the TOD may not outweigh the risk to miss important 
information in other AOIs of the interface.  
In conclusion, the current study is a demonstration that a tool designed to promote a specific cognitive function 
may come with unintended consequences on other aspects of dynamic decision-making [14,16,23]. We showed that 
providing a tool that helps managing the severe time constraints typically associated with complex dynamic 
situations can hinder change detection performance. It is therefore recommended that before being judged an 
effective tool that truly augment cognition, the design and validation of a decision support system include a 
thorough assessment of its effectiveness that goes beyond the cognitive function targeted by the system. The 
NSEEV model can provide invaluable diagnostic information about the effect of a tool on the user’ attentional 
allocation behaviors, and can help finding ways to improve its cognitive support. 
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